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ICONTENTS
The World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on public stockholding programmes have been under discussion among member 
countries for quite some time and are likely to be at the heart of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 
2017. This article proposes a new approach to advance toward a permanent solution on public stockholding programmes. This 
approach is based on splitting WTO rules into two components: i) the rules that specify how the support provided by public stocks 
should be calculated; and ii) the rules that define how WTO disciplines on support should be calculated. It focuses on the first, more 
technical, component. The author provides a systematic analysis of the biases in current WTO rules for estimating the support 
provided to farmers through public stockholding programmes and puts forward a proposal to correct them. 
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1INTRODUCTION
WTO rules on public stockholding programmes are defined 
by the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) that entered into 
force with the establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) on 1 January 1995. These rules are part of domestic 
support disciplines, as public procurement at administered 
prices is viewed as a way to provide farmers with a price 
support. The support provided by public stockholding 
programmes should be accounted for with the other forms of 
non-exempted domestic support. 
However, WTO rules on public stockholding programmes 
have been questioned by some member countries. In 2012 
and 2013, India and the G33 proposed modifications to 
these rules (Bellmann et al. 2013), which were consequently 
debated during the Bali Ministerial Conference in December 
2013. However, the Bali conference failed to produce an 
agreement on this issue: members simply agreed on a peace 
clause exempting the already existing public stockholding 
programmes from legal challenges until a “permanent 
solution” is found (WTO 2013; Diaz-Bonilla 2014). The 
need to find a permanent solution to the issue of public 
stockholding for food security purposes was reaffirmed in 
December 2015 during the Nairobi Ministerial Conference 
(WTO 2015; Glauber 2016). This issue is likely to be at the 
heart of the next WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos 
Aires in December 2017, in a context marked by the US-China 
grains dispute (WTO 2016; Yu 2017).  
In this article, we propose a new approach to advance toward 
a permanent solution on public stockholding programmes. 
This approach is based on splitting the problem into two 
components: 
• Component 1: Rethinking the rules that specify how the 
support provided by public stockholding programmes 
should be calculated, and 
• Component 2: Rethinking the WTO disciplines on 
providing support.  
Both aspects have been questioned by member countries. 
However, separating these two components may be a way 
to progress toward a permanent solution. Indeed, the first 
component is mainly technical: estimating the domestic 
support actually provided by public stockholding programmes 
is a matter of facts, and good faith people should agree quite 
easily on this issue. The second component is more political, 
as it is not related to how the world is, but rather to how it 
should be, and countries’ interests are obviously divergent on 
this issue. 
This article is focused exclusively on the first component. 
An extensive literature highlighted the gap between the 
economic and WTO measures of domestic support (Brink 
2011; Diaz-Bonilla 2013; Glauber 2016; Hoda and Gulati 2007 
and 2013; Josling 2015; Konandreas and Mermigkas 2014; 
Matthews 2014; Montemayor 2014; and Orden et al. 2011a). 
This gap is a huge problem, because — if the real support and 
the support calculated and bounded by the WTO diverge 
a lot — WTO rules will be at a loss to fulfil their economic 
objectives, such as reducing distortions while allowing 
countries to implement the policies they need to improve 
their food and nutritional security (Matthews 2014; Orden 
et al. 2011). In this article, we build on the above-cited works 
to provide a systematic analysis of the biases in current WTO 
rules and propose a simple solution to correct them. Our 
hope is that it will help to reach a permanent solution on the 
rules for estimating the support provided to farmers through 
public stockholding programmes. We also hope that getting 
the right metrics on the support will facilitate the discussions 
on the second component (the disciplines). 
We will successively present: some basics on the ways 
public stockholding programmes provide support to farmers 
(section 2); WTO rules defining how the support provided 
to farmers by public stockholding programmes should be 
calculated (section 3); the biases in these rules (section 4); 
and an estimation (for the case of maize) of the effect of 
these biases on the gap between the real and the calculated 
support, which proved to be huge (especially for developing 
countries) (section 5). This will lead us to discuss the different 
possible solutions to solve this problem and show that the 
only satisficing solution is designing new rules for estimating 
the support provided (section 6). Section 7 proposes a simple 
formula to get the right metrics on the support provided by 
public stockholding programmes. In section 8, we compare 
this solution with other solutions previously proposed by 
member countries and experts. Section 9 provides concluding 
remarks. 
SUPPORT PROVIDED 
TO FARMERS THROUGH 
(FOOD SECURITY) PUBLIC 
STOCKS
As part of their public stockholding programmes for food 
security purposes, governments buy food products (mainly 
grains or other staple products, such as milled cassava in 
some countries) and sell them (sometimes at a subsidized 
price) or distribute them for free to food insecure households. 
Their expected effects on food security are maintaining 
food insecure households’ access to food (by transferring 
2them food and/or by mitigating food price increases) and, 
sometimes, providing farmers remunerative prices to reduce 
rural poverty and stimulate their investments in food 
production. 
These programmes may provide support to farmers either 
directly (by paying a high price to suppliers) or indirectly 
through the effect of associated interventions on the 
domestic market price. Neither of these two effects are 
obvious or systematic. Many public stockholding programmes 
do not buy at a price higher than the market price even 
when they use an administered price (ICTSD 2016). Also, the 
effect of the associated interventions on the domestic price 
is rather ambiguous: it depends on the ratio between the 
quantity removed from the domestic market through public 
stock procurement (which exerts an upward pressure on the 
domestic price) and the quantity released by the government 
in the form of sales or free distribution (which exerts a 
downward pressure on the domestic price). It may, therefore, 
occur (especially in years of crisis) that the quantity released is 
higher that the quantity removed from the domestic market, 
resulting in a reduction of the domestic price. Indeed, the 
relationships are even more complicated, because the effect 
of public stockholding programmes on the domestic market 
depends not only on the quantities removed and released, 
but also on other parameters. In particular, the effect of 
associated interventions may be partly or fully compensated 
by an adjustment in imports or exports: for instance, the 
quantity removed from the domestic market through public 
stockholding procurement can be compensated by an increase 
in imports or a decrease in exports. Therefore, depending 
on the country situation and the way these programmes 
are used, public stockholding interventions can result in 
decreasing or increasing the domestic price (Deuss 2014; 
European Commission 2017; World Bank 2012).
The support provided by public stockholding programmes is 
the sum of:
• the support directly provided to the farmers who sell 
their production to the public stockholding programme: 
equal to the product of the quantity sold to the public 
stockholding programme (QSOLD TO PS) by the price 
difference between the procurement price (PPROC) and the 
price that would have prevailed on the domestic market 
without public stockholding intervention (P’D)
• the support indirectly provided to the farmers who sell 
their production on the domestic market: equal to the 
product of quantity sold on the domestic market (QSOLD ON 
DM) by the price difference between the domestic price (PD) 
and the price that would have prevailed on the domestic 
market without public stockholding intervention (P’D). 
Thus, the support provided by public stockholding 
programmes is given by the following formula: 
S = (PPROC – P’D) QSOLD TO PS + (PD – P’D) QSOLD ON DM        (1)
The problem with this formula is that the value of PD’ is 
unknown: PD’ cannot be observed, because it is not a real 
price, but a counterfactual one (the price that would have 
prevailed on the domestic market in the absence of public 
stockholding interventions). We must, therefore, replace 
PD’ by a proxy. But, which proxy? As public stockholding 
interventions may affect domestic prices, the only option is 
to use an external reference price (ERP). But which ERP? The 
best ERP is what economists call the parity price (PP). The 
PP is the price that should prevail on the domestic market 
in the situation without quantitative restrictions on external 
trade and without any intervention by public stockholding 
programs. For importing countries, the PP is equal to the c.i.f. 
import price plus import taxes (or minus import subsidies) 
plus transport cost from the port to the domestic market. 
For exporting countries, PP is equal to the f.o.b. export price 
minus export taxes (or plus export subsidies) minus transport 
cost from the domestic market to the port.  By replacing P’D 
with PP in formula 1, we get: 
S = (PPROC – PP) QSOLD TO PS + (PD – PP) QSOLD ON DM             (2)
WTO RULES DEFINING 
HOW SUPPORT PROVIDED 
BY PUBLIC STOCKS 
SHOULD BE CALCULATED
According to the AoA (WTO 1994), the support provided 
by public stockholding programmes to the producers of a 
specific commodity should be estimated as the product of i) 
the difference between the procurement price (PPROC) and the 
FERP and ii) the quantity of production “eligible” (QELIGIBLE):
                  SWTO = (PPROC – FERP) QELIGIBLE                     (3)
Several debates emerged among experts and WTO members 
on the way to interpret these definitions of FERP and QELIGIBLE. 
The different ways of interpreting the FERP and QELIGIBLE may 
significantly affect the estimated support and countries’ 
compliance with their WTO commitments, as shown by Brink 
(2014) for the case of rice, wheat, cotton, and sugarcane in 
India, and by Konandreas and Mermigkas (2014) for specific 
country-commodity pairs.
The FERP “shall generally be the average free on board (fob) 
unit value for the basic agricultural product concerned in a net 
exporting country and the average cost insurance and freight 
(CIF) unit value for the basic agricultural product concerned 
3in a net importing country in the base period” (WTO 1994, 
Annex 3, Article 9), the base period being 1986-88 for the 
countries that joined the WTO at the outset. Some experts 
and countries argued that the FERP should be considered 
as a real price (instead of a current price), meaning that the 
FERP should be corrected by the country inflation rate since 
the base period. However, the AoA does not support this 
interpretation, because the case for inflation is dealt with in 
another article of the AoA (Article 18.4), which mentions that 
“in the review process Members shall give due consideration 
to the influence of excessive rates of inflation on the ability of 
any Member to abide by its domestic support commitments.” 
Although some experts considered this article gives countries 
the right to update the base period FERP with the domestic 
inflation rate (Hoda and Gulati 2013), the dominant view is 
that this is not the case: Article 18.4 only mentions “excessive 
rates of inflation” and deals more with considerations to be 
taken into account when assessing the situation of countries 
that have been unable to comply with their commitments 
than with calculating the support itself (WTO 2014). It 
seems, therefore, that the FERP should be considered as a 
current price. Another debate is related to the currency that 
should be used to express the FERP. It is unclear whether 
countries i) can choose to express the FERP in their own 
currency or another (for instance the US dollar) or ii) have 
to use the currency they used in their first notification of 
the domestic support, when they notified their aggregate 
measure of support (AMS) for the base period (Brink 2014; 
Diaz-Bonilla 2014; Matthews 2014). Nothing in the AoA helps 
to choose between these two competing interpretations. We 
will, therefore, consider that the FERP is the price that was 
prevailing during the base period (it should not be corrected 
for inflation) and simulate both the case where the FERP 
is expressed in the local currency and the case where it is 
expressed in US dollars.
The quantity eligible (QELIGIBLE) is defined by the AoA as 
“the quantity of production eligible to receive the applied 
administered price” (Annex 3, Article 8). Some countries 
notify total national production, while others notify only 
the quantity actually procured by the public stockholding 
programme. Another interpretation (proposed, for instance, 
by Hoda and Gulati 2007) is that the relevant quantity is the 
share of production that is marketed (i.e., not self-consumed 
by farmers). Another view is that, if the authorities gave 
prior notice of the quantity they wanted to buy, QELIGIBLE 
would be this quantity. Therefore, we  have four different 
interpretations of QELIGIBLE (classified here from the smallest 
to the largest quantity): the quantity actually procured by the 
public stockholding programme, the quantity to be purchased 
announced by the authorities, the marketed share of national 
production, and total national production.1 The jurisprudence 
shed some light on this debate: the only decision on domestic 
support made by the WTO Appellate Body (known as the 
“Korea beef case”) confirmed that “production eligible refers 
to production that is ‘fit or entitled’ to be purchased rather 
than production that was actually purchased” and that if 
the quantity to be procured is announced in advance, this 
quantity should be considered as the eligible production 
(WTO 2000b, §120 and 121). (WTO 2000b, §120). It, thus, 
appears that, according to the WTO Appellate Body, QELIGIBLE 
should be the total national production, unless the quantity to 
be procured is announced in advance (in this case, QELIGIBLE is 
this quantity).
Note that in all cases, the semantic meaning of “eligible” implies that only 
quantities that fulfil the conditions to be sold to the public stock should 
be included (e.g. specific qualities, specific categories of farmers, specific 
regions of the country).
1
BIASES IN WTO RULES
There is usually a huge gap between the economic measure 
of the domestic support provided by public stockholding 
programmes (presented in section 2) and the WTO measure 
of this support (presented in section 3). As mentioned above, 
an extensive literature highlighted this gap (Brink 2011; Diaz-
Bonilla 2013; Glauber 2016; Hoda and Gulati 2007 and 2013; 
Josling 2015; Konandreas and Mermigkas 2014; Matthews, 
2014; Montemayor 2014; and Orden et al. 2011a). To show 
this gap may be huge and identify the biases that produce 
it, let us begin by presenting a numerical example. We 
consider the case of a country where the public stock agency 
purchases grain at a procurement price equal to 125, while 
the domestic price (in line with the current international 
price) is 100. From the quantity produced (equal to 100), 
10 is sold to the public stockholding agency; 40 is sold on 
the domestic market; and 50 is self-consumed by farmers. 
Let us assume that public stock procurement, by reducing 
the quantity available on the domestic market, results in 
increasing the domestic price from 100 to 110. The support 
actually provided is equal to 650: 250 provided to the 
farmers who supply the public stock ([125 -100] x 10) plus 
400 provided to the farmers who sell their production on the 
domestic market ([110 – 100] x 40). 
However, the support calculated according to WTO rules 
can be significantly different, because the price support 
is calculated by using a reference price related to the 
international price during a past reference period (assumed 
to be equal to 50 in the numerical example) instead of the 
current parity price (equal to 100). Moreover, this price 
support is applied to all national production, without 
differentiating between the share self-consumed by farmers, 
the share sold on the domestic market, and the share sold to 
the public stockholding agency. In this example, the support 
estimated according to WTO rules is therefore equal to 7500 
([125 – 50] X 100), more than 11.5 times the real amount of 
support provided. 
4The gap between the real support and the support estimated 
following WTO rules stems from three biases in WTO rules:
• Bias B1, resulting from using the unit value of imports 
or exports over a fixed past period (1986-88 for most 
countries) as the external reference price (ERP), instead of 
using the current PP.
• Bias B2, resulting from using the procurement price PPROC 
instead of the price prevailing on the domestic market PD 
to estimate the price support received by the farmers who 
sell their production on the domestic market. The implicit 
assumption is that the public stock procurement price 
PPROC makes the domestic price PD. It may be the case in 
some situations, but this is not always the case because 
the quantity procured (QPROC) may be too small to affect 
the domestic price PD or may be compensated by i) the 
quantity released in the form of sales or free distributions 
(QRELEASED) or ii) an adjustment in imports or exports. It 
may even occur that public stockholding interventions 
result in decreasing PD (when QRELEASED > QPROC).  
• Bias B3, resulting from the use of total national 
production instead of the quantity sold to estimate the 
support received by farmers. The implicit assumption 
behind WTO rules is that farmers sell all their production 
(no self-consumption). Obviously, this is often far from 
the reality in developing countries, especially for grain 
and other staple food products. 
The effect of these different biases on the estimated support 
is displayed in Figure 2 below (by using the same numerical 
example as in Figure 1).
FIGURE 1:
Numerical illustration of the gap between the real 
support and the support estimated according to WTO 
rules
FIGURE 2:
Illustration of the effect of biases B1, B2, and B3 on 
the support estimated according to WTO rules
Source: Author
Source: Author
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5FIGURE 3:
Dynamic of the international price of maize (annual 
prices are expressed in percentage of the 2016 price)
Source: US Department of Agriculture; World Bank.
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MAGNITUDE OF THE 
GAP BETWEEN THE 
REAL SUPPORT AND THE 
SUPPORT ESTIMATED 
ACCORDING TO WTO 
RULES (ESTIMATION FOR 
THE CASE OF MAIZE)
In the numerical example above, the support estimated 
according to WTO rules (SWTO) is about 11.5 the real amount 
of support provided (S). However, we have to go beyond this 
example and investigate the magnitude of the gap between 
S and SWTO in the real world. We choose to do this analysis 
for the case of maize, a commodity strongly related to food 
security issues in African, American, and some Asian countries.
MAGNITUDE OF B1
B1 results from the gap between the current PP (related to 
the current international price) and the WTO FERP. In the 
numerical example above, we assumed that the FERP accounts 
for only 50 percent of the PP. How far is that assumption 
from reality? Figure 3 below shows the dynamics of the 
international maize price. It appears that during the period 
1986-88 (which is the “base period” for most countries), 
the maize price was about 57 percent of its 2016 level. This 
means that for most countries the effect of bias B1 would be 
of the same order of magnitude as shown on Figure 2. 
It should be noted, however, that the situation is not the 
same for all countries. This is because the base period 
depends on when a country became a member of the WTO. 
Of the 133 WTO members subject to domestic support 
disciplines (all WTO members except the 28 members of the 
European Union (EU), because domestic support disciplines 
are calculated and notified at the EU level), 106 have 1986-
88 as a base period — these countries have been members 
since the beginning of the WTO, because they were already 
members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The other 27 members have a more recent base 
period. For instance, the base period is 1996-98 for China, 
1999-2001 for Vietnam, and 2006-08 for Russia. This 
means the gap between the real support S and the support 
estimated according to WTO rules SWTO can be very different, 
depending on when the country became a member of the 
WTO. For countries with a base period corresponding to years 
of high maize price, the FERP can be more than the current 
international price, meaning that for these countries, bias B1 
may result in underestimating the real amount of support 
provided, while for the vast majority of countries it results in 
strongly overestimating the support provided. 
The heterogeneity between countries may even be much 
stronger, because, as explained in section 2, it is unclear 
whether countries are allowed to use a FERP expressed in 
US dollars. If countries have to express the FERP in their 
own currencies, the gap between the FERP and the current 
international price stems not only from changes in the 
international maize price, but also changes in the country’s 
exchange rate. For countries whose exchange rates with the 
US dollar have decreased between the base period and now, 
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6the gap between the FERP and the current international 
price is likely to be much wider. Figure 4 below shows the 
magnitude of the FERP (expressed as a percentage of the 
current international price) when the FERP is expressed in 
local currency units. As expected, for high-income countries, 
the FERP expressed in local currency units is of the same order of 
magnitude as the FERP expressed in US dollar (about 50 percent 
of the current price). This reflects the fact these countries’ 
currencies have remained stable (on average) compared with 
the US dollar. However, for low-income countries, the situation 
is different: because their currencies’ exchange rates with the 
US dollar decreased over time, the FERP of these countries 
(when expressed in local currency units) accounts for less than 
20 percent of the current international price. Therefore, when 
countries have to use a FERP expressed in their own currencies, 
the effect of bias B1 is likely to be higher for low-income 
countries.
MAGNITUDE OF B2 TRADE POLICIES AND FOOD 
SECURITY
Bias B2 stems from the gap between the procurement price and 
the price prevailing on the domestic market. B2 results from 
assuming that the farmers who sell their production on the 
domestic market benefit from the procurement price (or, in other 
words, the procurement price makes the price on the domestic 
market). In fact, as explained in sections 2 and 4, this may occur 
in some occasions, but is not always the case. The quantity 
procured by the public stockholding agency may not be 
enough to affect the domestic price or may be compensated 
by the quantity released from the public stocks in the form of 
free distribution or sales. 
Do we have any reason to think bias B2 may be higher for 
specific categories of countries? The answer is undetermined. 
On the one hand, in many developing countries, a significant 
part of the quantity stored is likely to be released on 
the domestic market in the form of free distribution or 
sales, thereby mitigating or nullifying the effect of public 
stockholding procurement on the domestic price.  But, on 
the other hand, as in many developing countries, a significant 
part of maize production is self-consumed by farmers (see 
below) the same quantity procured by the public stockholding 
programme is likely to have a stronger effect on the domestic 
price: when 50 percent of the production is self-consumed, if 
the public stockholding agency purchases 10 percent of the 
production, it results in removing 20 percent of the quantity 
traded on the domestic market.
MAGNITUDE OF B3
Bias B3 arises because WTO rules have not taken into account 
the fact that, in many developing countries, a significant 
part of the production is self-consumed by farmers. The 
share of production self-consumed by farmers of course 
does not generate a support for farmers (whatever the level 
of the public stockholding programme procurement price 
and whatever the level of the domestic market price). In the 
numerical example above, we assumed that 50 percent of 
maize production is self-consumed by farmers. How far is that 
assumption from reality? No systematic data exists on the 
self-consumption rate by country and commodity. However, 
we have been able to gather data for maize in many sub-
Saharan African countries (see Table 1). This table shows 
that the percentage of production self-consumed by farmers 
can be well above 50 percent in many African countries (in 
Eastern and Southern African countries, the self-consumption 
rate is about 80 percent).  
FIGURE 4:
Fixed external reference price (expressed in local 
currency unit) as a percentage of the current 
international maize price (by country income group)
Sources: US Department of Agriculture and World 
Bank for maize price data; World Bank for exchange 
rate data and country income groups; WTO for 
member countries’ base periods.
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7FIGURE 5:
TABLE 1:
Real and estimated support (comparing the situation of 
a developed country and a developing country)
Percentage of maize production self-consumed by farmers (for selected African 
countries)
Source: Author
Western Africa + Chad and Cameroon Eastern and Southern Africa
Benin (2011) 35% Kenya (2007) 78%
Burkina (2003) 51% Malawi (2007) 79%
Cameroon (2007) 52% Mozambique (2005) 84%
Côte d'Ivoire (2008) 60% Zambia (2008) 86%
Ghana (2006) 27%
Guinea (2007) 78%
Liberia (2007) 66%
Mali (2011) 53%
Mauritania (2008) 60%
Niger (2011) 8%
Nigeria (2003) 39%
Senegal (2010) 31%
Sierra Leone (2003) 57%
Chad (2011) 36%
Togo (2011) 58%
Sources: MALVILAO project for West African countries + Chad and Cameroon (Bricas 
et al. 2016); Jayne et al. (2010) for Eastern and Southern African countries
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8MAGNITUDE OF THE GAP BETWEEN THE REAL 
SUPPORT AND THE SUPPORT ESTIMATED 
ACCORDING TO WTO RULES 
Putting together all the figures presented above we can get 
an estimation of the gap between the real support S and 
the support calculated according to WTO rules SWTO. We 
consider the case of two countries: a developed country and 
a developing country. Both procured 10 percent of national 
production at a price higher that the PP by 25 percent. Let 
us assume that, in both cases, this results in increasing 
the domestic price up to the level of the public stock 
procurement price (therefore B2 = 0). However, both the real 
support S and the support calculated according to WTO rules 
SWTO are likely to be different for the two countries (see Figure 
5).
The real support S provided is not the same for the two 
countries: in the developed country, 100 percent of the 
production is marketed (the 90 percent not sold to the 
public stockholding agency are sold on the domestic 
market) while in the developing country 80 percent of the 
production is self-consumed by farmers (from the 20 percent 
marketed, half is sold to the public stockholding agency, 
and half is sold on the domestic market). Therefore, the real 
support S provided by the public stockholding programme 
in the developed country is 2500 (25 x 100), while in the 
developing country it is only 500 (25 x 20). 
Moreover, the support calculated according to WTO rules 
SWTO is also different:  the FERP for the developed country 
accounts for 50 percent of the current international price, 
while for the developing country it accounts for only 20 
percent (because the exchange rate of its currency with the 
US dollar strongly decreased between the base period and 
now). Therefore, for the developed country, the support 
calculated according to WTO rules is 7500 ([125 – 50] * 100) 
whereas it is 9500 for the developing country ([125 – 20] * 
100).
The overall result is that for the developed country, the 
support estimated according to WTO rules accounts for 3 
times the real support (SWTO = 3 S) while for the developing 
country, it accounts for 19 times the real support (SWTO = 19 S).
THE NEED TO RESHAPE 
WTO RULES TO GET 
THE RIGHT METRICS ON 
SUPPORT PROVIDED BY 
PUBLIC STOCKHOLDING 
PROGRAMMES
The analysis presented above not only shows that WTO 
rules are biased, but also that the three biases in WTO rules 
significantly affect the calculated support (the support 
calculated according to WTO rules SWTO usually accounts for 
several times the real support S). Maybe more important, 
the effect of the biases in WTO rules are not the same for 
all countries: the gap between SWTO and the real support S is 
likely to be much wider for developing countries. 
Many proposals to solve this problem have been made by 
member countries and experts. The proposed solutions can be 
classified into three categories:
1. Play on the ambiguities of WTO rules. As explained in section 
3, there are many ways to interpret the formula that 
defines how the support provided by public stockholding 
programmes should be calculated. The ambiguities are 
related to the FERP and the eligible quantity. The different 
ways of interpreting the FERP and the eligible quantity may 
significantly affect the estimated support and countries’ 
compliance with their WTO commitments, as shown 
by Brink (2014) for the case of rice, wheat, cotton, and 
sugarcane in India; by Konandreas and Mermigkas (2014) 
for specific country commodity pairs; and by Montemayor 
(2014) for food staples in five developing countries. Some 
member countries and experts made proposals based on 
interpreting the rules in a way that results in reducing the 
gap between the real support provided and the support 
taken into account by the WTO. More precisely, it has been 
proposed: 
• to use as a measure of the eligible quantity i) the 
quantity actually procured; ii) the quantity announced 
to be procured (Diaz-Bonilla 2014); or iii) the marketable 
quantity (Hoda and Gulati 2007; and Montemayor 2014), 
instead of the national production; 
• to update the FERP with the country inflation rate (Diaz-
Bonilla 2014; Hoda and Gulati 2013; Konandreas and 
Mermigkas 2014);
9• to express the FERP in US dollars instead of in national 
currency units (Diaz-Bonilla 2014; Montemayor 2014; 
Konandreas and Mermigkas 2014).
2. Relax the disciplines on domestic support. Several ways 
can be used. First, the support provided to farmers may 
be exempted of WTO disciplines in specific cases. For 
instance, when the food is purchased from low-income or 
resource-poor producers (as proposed in November 2012 
by an informal proposal of the G33, see WTO 2012), when 
the quantity procured does not exceed a given percentage 
of local production (Montemayor 2014), or when the 
country is a least-developed country (Glauber 2016). 
Second, the maximum allowed level of non-exempted 
support may be increased (for instance, by increasing the 
level of the de minimis, as proposed by a group of countries 
in May 2013, see Bellmann et al. 2013). Third, the right can 
be given to countries to go beyond their domestic support 
ceiling when justified by specific circumstances (safeguard 
clause). 
3. Change the rules on how the support provided by PS 
programmes should be calculated. Many proposals have 
been made in that direction. They will be presented in 
sections 7 and 8. 
Solutions based on the first strategy (playing on the 
ambiguities of WTO rules) are highly risky. If a country is 
challenged, the Panel or the WTO Appellate Body may well 
consider the country used a wrong methodology to calculate 
the support provided by public stockholding programmes. 
In fact, this is exactly what happened during the Korea beef 
case. The government of South Korea argued that the quantity 
eligible is the quantity actually purchased because this is the 
quantity for which there is available money to pay the public 
procurement price (WTO 2000a, §371). But, the Panel (and 
then the Appellate Body) explained that this argument is not 
acceptable and recalculated the support provided. The Panel 
argued that the quantity eligible is the marketable quantity 
(“it is marketable production as a whole which benefits from 
this type of [price] support,” WTO 2000a, §832). However, 
the decision made by the WTO Appellate Body (after South 
Korea appealed the decision) did not make any mention of 
the marketable quantity, but rather stated that “production 
eligible refers to production that is ‘fit or entitled’ to be 
purchased rather than production that was actually purchased” 
and that if the quantity to be procured is announced in 
advance, this quantity should be considered as the eligible 
production (WTO 2000b, §120 and 121). 
The proposal to update the FERP with the inflation rate has 
been made by several experts (Diaz-Bonilla 2014; Hoda and 
Gulati 2013; and Konandreas and Mermigkas 2014). It was 
also part of the proposal made in September 2013 in a “non-
paper” proposed by a subset of G33 members. Countries 
and experts who support that option base their arguments 
on article 18.4 of the AoA. This article mentions that “in the 
review process Members shall give due consideration to the 
influence of excessive rates of inflation on the ability of any 
Member to abide by its domestic support commitments.” 
The fact that only “excessive” rates of inflation are mentioned 
led the authors of the September 2013 non-paper to propose 
taking into account rates of inflation exceeding 4 percent 
when estimating the support provided by public stockholding 
programmes. However, it seems that Article 18.4 deals more 
with considerations to be taken into account when assessing 
the situation of countries that have been unable to comply 
with their commitments than with calculating the support 
itself, as argued by some experts (Brink 2014) and clarified by 
WTO Committee on Agriculture (WTO 2014).
The proposal has also been made to express the FERP in US 
dollars instead of national currency units (see for instance 
Glauber 2016). Whether countries have the right to do so or 
not is unclear. It is in fact a rather technical debate: the text 
of the AoA says both that the support should be calculated by 
“taking into account the constituent data and methodology 
used in the tables of supporting material incorporated by 
reference in Part IV of the member’s Schedule [meaning 
country notification for the base period]” (Article 1.a.ii) 
and that it should be calculated “in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement, including Article 6, and with 
the constituent data and methodology used in the tables 
of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV 
of the Member’s Schedule” (Article 1.h.ii). While the first 
formulation (“taking into account”) seems to give countries 
some flexibility, the second one (“should be in accordance to”) 
seems much more restrictive. The Appellate Body decision 
during the Korea beef case clarified that the right wording 
is “in accordance with” for the text of the Agreement (with 
its annexes), but is only “taking into account” regarding the 
methodology used by countries for their first notification 
(related to the base period). According to Diaz-Bonilla 
(2014), this means that a change in the currency used by a 
country to notify its FERP is acceptable. But, Brink (2014) 
disagrees with this interpretation. This has many implications, 
because “only a handful of developing countries have 
specified FERPs or AMS ceilings in foreign currency in their 
commitments (Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, 
Turkey, and Venezuela)” (Matthews 2014). Therefore, if Brink’s 
interpretation is correct, many developing countries have to 
express the FERP in their own currency units, which results 
in strongly increasing the bias in the calculated support (see 
Figure 4). 
It therefore appears that playing on the ambiguities of WTO 
rules is a highly risky strategy. The only solution of this kind 
that is maybe not too risky is using the quantity announced 
in advance to measure the eligible quantity (because this 
interpretation is supported by the jurisprudence stemming from 
the decision of the WTO Appellate Body during the Korea beef 
case). However, this option is not satisfactory, as it may allow 
countries to strongly underestimate the real support provided 
(especially when all the marketed quantity benefit from the price 
support while only the announced quantity would be accounted 
for). Indeed, in Indonesia, the public stocks agency (BULOG) 
succeeded in stabilizing the price of rice on the domestic 
market while buying always less than 10 percent of the national 
production (Timmer 1996). 
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Of course, it would be possible to render these strategies 
less risky by promoting a collective clarification on the right 
interpretation of what are the FERP and the eligible quantity. 
However, this would require a new agreement between 
countries at the WTO level. And, in this case, it seems much 
more relevant to agree on rules that allow removing all the 
biases instead of agreeing on ways to only reduce them.
Solutions based on the second strategy (relaxing the 
disciplines on public stockholding programmes) are not 
appropriate to compensate the biases in the estimation of 
the support provided. This is because the effect of the biases 
on the gap between the real support S and the calculated 
support SWTO is different for each country-commodity pair 
(see Figure 5). If the gap between S and SWTO was the same 
for all countries and all commodities, it would be possible to 
compensate the effect of the biases by adjusting the level of 
the ceiling. However, as we saw in Figure 5, this is far from 
being the case. This does not mean there is no justification for 
relaxing the disciplines on public stockholding programmes, 
but this certainly means that relaxing the disciplines is not an 
adequate solution to compensate the biases in WTO rules.
Solutions based on the third strategy (modifying the rules 
that define how the support should be calculated) are 
therefore the only ones that may allow establishing fairness 
between countries by fully correcting the biases in WTO rules. 
A simple solution to get the right metrics on the support 
provided by public stockholding programmes is presented in 
section 7. Section 8 highlights the links between this solution 
and other solutions previously proposed by member countries 
and experts. 
A PROPOSAL OF NEW 
RULES FOR A FAIR 
ESTIMATION OF THE 
SUPPORT PROVIDED BY 
PUBLIC STOCKHOLDING 
PROGRAMMES
Getting an unbiased estimate of the support provided by 
public stockholding programmes means eliminating biases 
B1, B2, and B3. As shown in section 2, this can theoretically 
be done by considering:
• the share of production self-consumed by farmers does 
not benefit from any price support
• the quantity sold to the public stockholding programmes 
benefits from a price support equal to the procurement 
price minus the PP of the considered commodity (PPROC – 
PP)
• the quantity sold on the domestic market benefits from a 
price support equal to the price prevailing on the domestic 
market minus the PP of the considered commodity (PD – 
PP)
In other words, the theoretical solution is applying formula 
(2):
          S = (PPROC – PP) QSOLD TO PS + (PD – PP) QSOLD ON DM     (2)    
However, this formula cannot be used by the WTO, because 
it uses the PP, which is only known at the end of the year 
(the PP depends on the average unit value of imports 
or exports during the year). For countries to choose the 
parameters of interventions under public stockholding 
programmes (especially PPROC) with satisfactory knowledge 
of the support they will generate, countries need prior 
knowledge of the ERP that will be used in the calculation. 
The ERP, therefore, cannot be the PP: it should be a predictor 
variable of PP.
We propose to use PP* as a predictor variable of PP. The 
variable PP* is defined as follows:
• for net importing countries: the average unit value of 
imports during the last completed year plus import taxes 
or minus import subsidies 
• for net exporting countries: the average unit value of 
exports during the last completed year minus export taxes 
or plus export subsidies 
Taking into account import or export taxes or subsidies 
is necessary to avoid attributing an effect to public 
stockholding programmes due to taxes or subsidies. Let us 
assume, for instance, two countries A and B where the import 
of the considered commodity is taxed at 20 percent. As the 
international price is 100, the import price cost (or PP) is 120 
in both countries. Let us assume that in country A there is 
no public stockholding programme, while in country B there 
is one with interventions that do not affect the domestic 
price. In both countries, the support provided is exactly 
the same, and the tool used to provide it is also the same 
(a 20 percent tariff on imports). Not including the import 
tax in the estimation of the support provided by the public 
stockholding programmes would result in assuming that 
country B provides domestic support while country A does 
not. As stated by Matthews (2014, 17), in this case, the price 
support provided by public procurements “is not additional 
to that provided by the border protection alone so that its 
incremental trade-distorting effect is minimal.”
The formula to estimate the support provided by public 
stockholding programmes therefore becomes:
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SWTO = (PPROC – PP*) QSOLD TO PS + (PD – PP*) QSOLD ON DM       (4)
With:
PPROC = PS procurement price
PP* = average unit value of imports during the last 
completed year plus import taxes or minus import subsidies 
(for net importing countries) or average unit value of exports 
during the last completed year minus export taxes or plus 
export subsidies (for net exporting countries)
PD = average price on the domestic market during the 
considered year
QSOLD TO PS = quantity sold to the PS
QSOLD ON DM = quantity sold on the domestic market
PPROC and QSOLD TO PS are theoretically public data (which 
should be notified by countries to the WTO).  PD can be 
observed: it is the average producer price calculated as the 
annual average of the prices collected on rural markets (the 
main points of sale for farmers). This data is already used in 
country notifications to calculate the value of production 
(and therefore the de minimis). QSOLD ON DM is the share of 
production sold by farmers on the domestic market. It can 
be estimated as the share of production that is neither self-
consumed by farmers nor sold to the public stockholding 
programmes. The quantity self-consumed by farmers is 
usually estimated by applying a ratio r to the estimated 
production. This ratio r – farmers’ self-consumption rate – is 
estimated with household survey data (in most countries, 
research institutes or the country statistical organisation 
regularly produces this kind of data). In other words, QSOLD ON 
DM can be estimated by applying the following formula: QSOLD 
ON DM = QPRODUCED - r QPRODUCED - QSOLD TO PS. Finally, the PP can be 
calculated easily with data on i) country average unit value of 
imports or exports during the preceding year and ii) country 
import or export tax (or subsidy) rate.
Formula (4) therefore provides a simple way to estimate 
as accurately as possible the support provided by public 
stockholding programmes. It is imperfect, however, because 
the external reference price PP* is based on the import or 
export unit value of the preceding year and the price may 
have changed substantially meanwhile. Therefore, some 
countries may be in difficulty if the international price 
increases sharply between Y-1 and Y, or if the country’s 
exchange rate with the US dollar fell significantly between 
Y-1 and Y. Another limitation is that PP* does not include 
the transport cost between the border and the domestic 
market (these costs may be substantial, especially for 
landlocked countries, see FAO 2014 for an example). To 
solve these two problems, we propose two (complementary) 
options:
• Introduce an abatement: the support bound by the 
country at the WTO should not be the support SWTO 
estimated with formula (4) but let us say 70 percent of 
SWTO for landlocked importing countries and 80 percent of 
SWTO for other countries. The logic behind this abatement 
is the same as the one used to determine whether drivers 
are complying with the speed limit. As the measurements 
taken by speed cameras are imperfect (in France the 
margin of error is around 10 percent), drivers are given the 
benefit of the doubt if they are flashed at a speed higher 
than the speed limit but lower than the speed limit plus 
the margin of error for speed cameras.
• Include a safeguard clause exempting countries from WTO 
disciplines on domestic support when i) their exchange 
rate has collapsed during the year, or ii) the international 
price has risen sharply during the year. Indeed, in these 
situations, a great part of the calculated support would 
not be due to PS interventions (but rather to the increase 
in the PP).
LINK WITH OTHER 
PROPOSALS
A simple way to compare proposals is to check the solution 
they suggest to correct the different biases B1, B2, and B3. 
CORRECTING B1. 
Our proposal to remove bias B1 is replacing the FERP by a 
predictor variable of the current PP: PP*, which is based on 
the PP of the preceding year. 
This proposal is quite close to a proposal made by Diaz-
Bonilla (2013) and supported by different experts (such as 
Glauber 2016 and to some extent Matthews 2014). Their 
proposal is that, if the public procurement price is equal or 
inferior to the current PP, the support provided by the public 
stockholding programme should be assumed to be non-
distortive (and, therefore, exempted from any discipline). 
Our proposal is very close to Diaz-Bonilla’s proposal but 
more comprehensive. To illustrate why, let us consider the 
case of two countries A and B. Let us assume that the FERP 
is 50, the current international price is 100, and the import 
tax rate is 20 percent in both countries. Therefore, the current 
PP is 120 for both countries. If the procurement price is 120 
for country A and 125 for country B, current WTO rules give 
a support of 70 for country A and of 75 for country B, while 
the real support provided by public stockholding programmes 
is 0 for country A and 5 for country B. The solution proposed 
by Diaz-Bonilla solves the problem of country A but left 
unchanged the problem of country B (the calculated support 
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would be equal to 75 while the real support is 5). Conversely, 
the methodology we propose solves the problem for both 
countries.
Our proposal is also close to the proposal made in September 
2013 in a “non-paper” submitted by a subset of G33 members. 
Their proposal was “that developing countries could use a 
three-year rolling average to calculate how much their food 
stockholding purchases contributed towards their overall farm 
support limit, instead of benchmarking support against the 
external reference price. Countries should also be allowed to use 
last year’s average price in the largest 1-3 suppliers of foodstuffs 
in the country” (Bellmann et al. 2013, p.2). What matters is 
using a good predictor variable of the PP of the current year: it 
can be the price of the preceding year, the rolling average of the 
three preceding years or other indicators based on past price. 
We propose to use the price of the preceding year, because it is 
the simplest indicator, and it is often the best predictor variable 
of the average price of the current year. What also matters is to 
implement complementary measures to take into account the 
transport cost between the border and the domestic market and 
the movement of international prices or exchange rates between 
the preceding year (or the average price of the three preceding 
years) and the current year. This is the reason why we propose 
to introduce an abatement and safeguard clauses (see section 7). 
CORRECTING B2. 
Correcting bias B2 means splitting apart within the marketed 
quantity the share sold to the public stockholding agency 
(which receives the public procurement price) and the share 
sold on the domestic market (which receives the domestic 
market price). Orden et al. (2011a, 15) are close to this idea 
when they state one of the main deficiencies in the WTO 
measurement of market price support is “the use of the 
administered [procurement] price instead of the prevailing 
domestic price to calculate the level of support per unit of 
output.” However, to our best knowledge, we are the first to 
propose explicitly a complete solution to correct bias B2. 
CORRECTING B3.
To correct B3, we propose to consider that the share of 
production self-consumed by farmers does not receive any 
support. In other words, the price support should apply only 
to the marketed share of national production, meaning the 
quantity eligible should be the marketable quantity. This 
proposal has already been made by experts (for instance, 
Hoda and Gulati 2013; and Montemayor 2014). It was also a 
key element of the Panel’s decision in the South Korea beef 
case (however, as already mentioned, after South Korea 
appealed the Panel’s decision, the Appellate Body did not 
make any mention of the concept of marketed or marketable 
quantity).
CONCLUSION
In this article, we propose a new approach to advance toward 
a permanent solution on public stockholding programmes. 
This approach is based on splitting WTO rules into two 
components: i) the rules that specify how the support 
provided by public stocks should be calculated and ii) the 
rules that define how WTO disciplines on support should 
be calculated. The article deals with the first component. 
It builds on the existing literature to provide a systematic 
analysis of the biases in current WTO rules and proposes a 
simple solution to correct them. Our hope is that it will help 
member countries define unbiased rules for calculating the 
support provided to farmers through public stockholding 
programmes. 
We also hope that getting the right metrics on the support 
provided will facilitate the discussions on the second 
component (the disciplines). Many debates on the second 
component have already occurred among member countries 
and experts. Is it better to develop exemptions, to increase 
the maximum allowed level of non-exempted support, 
or to design safeguard clauses for countries facing special 
situations? Is it better to keep the current system for 
commitments on non-exempted supports (de minimis and 
AMS) or to develop a new approach? Options have been 
discussed for a long time at the WTO (WTO 2008). Many 
proposals have been made by member countries (WTO 2012; 
Bellmann et al.  2013) and experts. Analyses of these options 
have recently been produced (see, for instance, Glauber 
2016; Greenville 2017; ICTSD 2017; Josling 2015, Konandreas 
and Mermigkas 2014; Matthews 2014; Montemayor 
2014; Orden et al. 2011b). Apart from these reflections, a 
second body of analytic works may be very useful to make 
progress on the second component (the disciplines on public 
stockholding programmes). As the final objective is to find 
an equilibrium point between reducing domestic support 
and allowing countries to implement the policies they need 
to improve their food security, it is extremely important 
to clarify the role of public stockholding programmes in 
improving food security in developing countries. Syntheses 
on this question have been produced recently (Deuss 2014; 
European Commission 2017; World Bank 2012).
It should also be noted, as highlighted by different experts 
(Diaz-Bonilla 2013; Glauber 2016; Josling 2015), countries’ 
public stockholding programmes can be challenged at the 
WTO on the basis of the AoA, as well as the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). Getting the 
right metrics on the support provided to farmers through 
public stockholding programmes is, therefore, important for 
countries’ compliance with not only the AoA, but also the 
ASCM. 
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